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What’s up with Prefrontal Cortex?
A Commentary on John-Dylan Haynes
Caspar M. Schwiedrzik
The prefrontal cortex is perhaps one of the most intriguing areas of the brain, and
considered by many to be involved in a whole battery of higher cognitive func-
tions. However, evidence for a direct involvement in conscious perception, although
often postulated, remains inconclusive. In his paper, John-Dylan Haynes presents
results from experiments using multivariate decoding techniques on human func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging data that speak against the assertion that pre-
frontal cortex broadcasts the contents of consciousness throughout the brain. I
consider potential reasons for these null results, as well as where else we may
look for the neural correlates of consciousness. Specifically, I propose that con-
scious perception arises when distributed neurons are bound into coherent assem-
blies—a process that does not require relay through specific brain areas. 
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1 Introduction
There  is  a  striking  parallel  between the hier-
archical organization of behavior and the hier-
archical  organization  of  the  cerebral  cortex
(Botvinick 2008). It is thus tempting to assign
consciousness,  at  least  historically  often  con-
sidered  to  be  one  of  our  highest  functions
(Jackendoff 1987;  Markowitsch 1995),  to  the
prefrontal cortex (PFC), which is positioned at
the top of the cortical hierarchy. While the idea
that consciousness can be localized to a single
brain area has now been discredited, many cur-
rent theories of consciousness still consider the
PFC a key player in the emergence of conscious
perception (Dehaene & Changeux 2011;  Lau &
Rosenthal 2011).  And  indeed,  a  multitude  of
neuroimaging studies has shown differential ac-
tivation for perceived vs. unperceived stimuli in
various parts of the PFC (Dehaene et al. 2001;
Lau &  Passingham 2006;  Sahraie et  al. 1997;
Schwiedrzik et al. 2014). A very prominent the-
oretical proposal on the neural correlates of con-
sciousness,  the  Global  Neuronal  Workspace
(GNW) model  by Stanislas  Dehaene and col-
leagues,  posits  that  the  PFC  (in  conjunction
with parietal cortex) serves to distribute inform-
ation that is processed in unconscious modules
to the entire brain, and that it is this broad-
casting  of  information  that  gives  rise  to  con-
scious experience (Dehaene & Changeux 2011).
The PFC may be particularly well equipped to
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do so, for example because it hosts an abund-
ance of neurons with long-distance connections,
so called “von Economo” neurons, which seem
ideally  suited  to  both  receive  and  deliver  in-
formation from all areas of the brain to all areas
of  the  brain  (Dehaene &  Changeux 2011).  A
prediction that can be directly derived from this
account and that has been eloquently put for-
ward by John-Dylan Haynes is  that the PFC
should  at  least  temporarily  represent  the  in-
formation that we consciously perceive, i.e., it
should  directly  encode  the  contents  of  con-
sciousness  (Haynes 2009;  this collection).  To
test this idea, Haynes and his coworkers have
used a neuroimaging technique that allows for
exquisite access to perceptual content, namely
multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) of func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) sig-
nals. In this technique, powerful machine learn-
ing algorithms are used to analyze spatially-dis-
tributed patterns of brain activity, and a brain
region  is  said  to  represent  the  content  of  in-
terest if its activity patterns allow the reliable
classification—in the case of  consciousness—of
which stimulus the subject perceived on a given
trial. This contrasts with previous fMRI studies
not using MVPA: because these studies do not
directly  address  content,  activity  in  the  PFC
(and other regions) that differentiates perceived
from not perceived trials could in principle re-
flect other aspects of conscious experience, for
example the allocation of attentional resources
or  working  memory.  The  stunning  result  of
Haynes’  investigations  is  that  while  MVPA
shows that perceptual content can be decoded
from higher  sensory areas,  PFC activity  does
not  yield  decoding  accuracies  higher  than
chance level. So what’s up with PFC? 
2 Neuronal representations in the PFC 
Indeed, the inability to decode perceptual con-
tent  from  the  PFC  runs  counter  intuitions
about PFC functions we have from animal mod-
els such as the macaque monkey, where repres-
entations of  (perceptual)  content  can be even
more directly assessed than with MVPA, by us-
ing  electrophysiological  recordings  from  single
neurons. These studies show that PFC neurons
are tuned for and thus represent perceptual fea-
tures such as visual motion direction (Zaksas &
Pasternak 2006)  or  somatosensory  flutter  fre-
quency (Romo et al. 1999).  Even more direct
evidence  for  the  representation  of  perceptual
content in the PFC comes from a recent study
by  Theofanis Panagiotaropoulos et  al. (2012),
which shows that  single  PFC neurons  exhibit
stimulus-specific activity modulations as a func-
tion of  subjective perception under flash sup-
pression,  a  technique  that  can  render  visual
stimuli temporarily invisible. 
In  the  absence  of  direct  electrophysiolo-
gical recordings from human PFC, one possible
explanation  for  this  discrepancy  is  that  the
macaque brain is organized in a totally different
way to the human brain. But while theoretically
possible, this seems highly unlikely (Passingham
2009;  Roelfsema &  Treue 2014). Alternatively,
one may consider whether certain properties of
the neural representations in the PFC may pose
limitations to the ability of  the  fMRI MVPA
technique  to  decode  their  content.  This  is  in
light of the fact that decoding of content from
human PFC has been unsuccessful not only in
the context of conscious perception, but also in
the context of working memory, which has led
to a radical reinterpretation of the role of the
PFC in this domain (Sreenivasan et al. 2014). 
It  has  been  hypothesized  that  successful
decoding of  stimulus features  such as orienta-
tion or motion direction from sensory areas re-
lies  upon  the  presence  of  orderly  spatial  ar-
rangements of these features in cortical columns
or maps (Freeman et al. 2011; Kamitani & Tong
2005).  It  is  thus  worth  asking  the  question
whether PFC exhibits a similar map-like struc-
ture, or whether the spatial arrangement of fea-
tures in the PFC already renders the likelihood
of  decoding  any kind of  information  from its
fMRI activity unlikely. For example, while maps
representing space have been identified in the
human PFC, they are much smaller than retino-
topic maps in early visual areas, and intersub-
ject variability in their location is much higher
(Hagler &  Sereno 2006).  Furthermore,  it  is
known from experiments in monkeys that only a
subset  of  the  neurons within the  PFC subre-
gions in which these maps have been found ac-
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tually  displays  any  spatial  preference  (Fun-
ahashi et al. 1989; Rainer et al. 1998). Import-
antly,  the  PFC also  has  a  more  complicated
cytoarchitecture than sensory areas, with longer
and  more  complex  dendrites  that  allow  for
sampling of information from a wider range of
inputs (Jacobs et al. 2001),  which may affect
the spatial scale at which information is repres-
ented  and can be  read out.  Nevertheless,  the
overall picture that arises from studies employ-
ing  optical  imaging  and  microstimulation  in
monkeys is that at least several subregions of
the PFC are topographically organized in a sim-
ilar fashion as sensory areas (Roe 2010). How-
ever, while the topography of the PFC may be
favorable  to  MVPA,  neural  representations  in
the PFC seem to exhibit more complex features
and dynamics on a single neuron and popula-
tion  level  than the  representations  in  sensory
areas where MVPA has been particularly suc-
cessful. For example, recent studies in monkeys
show that PFC representations are very high di-
mensional (Rigotti et al. 2013), that selectivity
is not fixed but can be acquired (Bichot et al.
1996),  that  selectivity  can  change  over  time
even within a trial (Stokes et al. 2013), and that
populations of PFC neurons represent multiple
stimulus dimensions at  the same time even if
one  dimension  is  unattended  (Mante  et  al.
2013).  Thus,  the dimensionality and temporal
instability of neural representations in the PFC
may pose a serious challenge to fMRI MVPA
experiments, given that they rely on an inher-
ently slow, hemodynamic signal that integrates
neural activity over time. 
Putting  these  and  other  (Anderson &
Oates 2010;  Vilarroya 2013)  potential  limita-
tions of the MVPA approach aside, what other
evidence do we have that the PFC is actually
involved in conscious perception? In particular,
is there causal evidence for a role of the PFC in
conscious perception? 
3 Beyond decoding: Causal evidence for 
a role of the PFC in conscious 
perception? 
Early studies in macaque monkeys have found
that lesions to the PFC can increase the lumin-
ance threshold (Latto &  Cowey 1971) and de-
grade  detection  performance  (Kamback 1973).
More recently, studies  in humans using trans-
cranial  magnetic  stimulation  have  similarly
found that stimulation of the PFC can impair
the visibility of stimuli (Rounis et al. 2010), but
also improve detection rates during visual mask-
ing (Grosbras &  Paus 2003).  Finally,  Antoine
Del Cul et  al. have  shown  that  perceptual
thresholds are increased in patients with relat-
ively small prefrontal lesions even when atten-
tional effects are tightly controlled for (2009).
However, none of these studies has shown dra-
matic  impairments,  but rather modulations of
performance or perception. Total blindness has
only  been  reported  after  removing  the  entire
frontal cortex including (parts of) the underly-
ing cingulate cortex in monkeys, and only lasted
for  a  few days in several  cases  (Nakamura &
Mishkin 1986). Importantly, other lesion studies
in humans have not reported perceptual deficits
at all (Heath et al. 1949; Markowitsch & Kessler
2000).  Taken together  with  the  fact  that  the
PFC  is  also  active  during  unconscious  pro-
cessing  (Diaz &  McCarthy 2007;  Lau &
Passingham 2007; van Gaal et al. 2008), not de-
activated under Thiopental  anesthesia  (Veselis
et al. 2004), but deactivated during rapid eye
movement sleep when vivid (non-lucid) dreams
can  be  experienced  (Braun et  al. 1998;  Des-
seilles et al. 2011;  Muzur 2002), this indicates
that the evidence for a direct, specific involve-
ment of the PFC in conscious perception is cur-
rently inconclusive at best.
4 An alternative to localization
Luckily, we can do without PFC, at least for the
purposes of explaining conscious perception, while
still maintaining many of the other, more compel-
ling aspects of the GNW model. One central com-
ponent that the GNW model shares with several
other  proposals  about  the  neural  correlates  of
consciousness  (for  example  Melloni &  Singer
2010; Tononi 2004; von der Malsburg 1997) is the
concept of global integration of information. In
light of the modular organization of the brain, a
mechanism is required that brings information to-
gether such that an integrated, coherent percept
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Figure  1:  Neuronal synchrony binds distributed neurons into coherent assemblies, giving rise to con-
scious experience. Consider an experiment in which the subject is confronted with two superimposed, transparent
surfaces of moving dots, as shown in the first column. (a) The dots on one surface are green and move to the left, and
the dots on the other surface are red and move to the right. The two colors of dots are represented in a brain area cod -
ing for color, while the two motion directions are represented in an area coding for motion. If the neurons coding for
green in the color area synchronize with the neurons coding for motion to the left in the motion area, and the neurons
coding for red synchronize with the neurons coding for motion to the right, the two surfaces are consciously perceived.
(b) A change in experience does not require a change in activity levels within areas, but a change of which neurons are
synchronized. The opposite percept of (a) arises if neurons coding for green are synchronized with neurons coding for
motion to the right, and if neurons coding for red are synchronized with neurons coding for motion to the left. Such
content-specific synchronization between neurons has for example been observed in working-memory tasks in monkeys
(Salazar et al. 2012). (c) Even when activity is synchronized within the color or motion area, respectively, a coherent
conscious percept does not arise unless the areas are synchronized with each other. 
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can be formed. One attractive neural mechanism
that can account for this requirement is neuronal
synchrony (Bosman et al. 2012;  Bressler et  al.
1993;  Salazar 2012).  As  has  been  discussed  in
greater detail elsewhere (Melloni & Singer 2010;
Melloni this collection;  Singer this collection),
areas can be brought into direct contact with each
other by synchronizing their neuronal activity, for
example by phase alignment of neuronal oscilla-
tions, thus binding them into a functionally co-
herent assembly that forms a distributed repres-
entation of perceptual content. This self-organiz-
ing process can flexibly create and dissolve assem-
blies  on top of  a fixed anatomical  architecture
and does so without the need for anatomical con-
vergence or broadcasting bottlenecks. 
For example, imagine that a subject is con-
fronted with two superimposed, transparent sur-
faces of moving dots (Figure 1). The dots on one
surface are green and move to the left, and the
dots on the other surface are red and move to the
right. The two colors of dots are represented in a
brain area coding for color, while the two motion
directions are represented in an area coding for
motion. For the subject to become conscious of
the two surfaces, the neurons coding for green in
the color area would need to synchronize their
activity with the neurons coding for motion to
the left in the motion area, and the neurons cod-
ing for red would need to synchronize with the
neurons coding for motion to the right (Figure
1a). If the dots change direction, a new state of
synchronization needs to be established, this time
linking  neurons  coding  for  green  with  neurons
coding for motion to the right, and neurons cod-
ing for red with neurons coding for motion to the
left (Figure 1b). Hence, while the contents of the
subject’s experience are determined by the spe-
cific neuronal assemblies being active, conscious
perception would be an emergent property of the
state of synchronization. Recent tracing and mod-
elling work in the macaque brain suggests that
the kind of direct connectivity required to flexibly
instantiate numerous, high-dimensional combina-
tions of features is indeed afforded by high-dens-
ity,  reciprocal  connections  between  brain  areas
(Markov et al. 2013). 
Theoretical  considerations  and  empirical
evidence further suggest that the critical feature
differentiating  conscious  from  unconscious  pro-
cessing is the spatial scale at which information is
exchanged: while the integration of information in
local  modules,  even  in  higher  sensory  areas
(Sterzer et al. 2008), does not give rise to con-
scious experience by itself, large-scale integration
over long distances does (Del Cul et  al. 2007;
Melloni et al. 2007). In the example of the trans-
parent surfaces, this implies that even when activ-
ity  is  synchronized  within  the  color  or  motion
area,  respectively,  a  coherent  conscious  percept
cannot  arise  unless  the  areas  are  synchronized
with each other (Figure 1c). Taken together, func-
tional  connectivity  between  distributed  brain
areas (i.e., connectivity that does not imply that
one drives or controls the other) is an attractive
alternative to localization in PFC as a candidate
for the neural correlate of consciousness. 
Coming back to the MVPA technique, this
proposal makes a clear prediction that could be
tested using decoding algorithms: specifically, one
would  predict  that  the  large-scale  connectivity
patterns  between brain regions for different per-
cepts should differ, even if only slightly, for differ-
ent conscious contents, and hence that conscious
content  should  be  decodable  from  them.  This
may well be the case in light of the fact that, at a
much coarser scale, the neural correlates of audit-
ory and visual awareness involve different brain
networks (Eriksson et al. 2007), and that higher
decoding accuracy for a subject’s percept can be
achieved if the joint activity patterns of several
areas are considered instead of only singular pat-
terns  (Pessoa &  Padmala 2007).  The  MVPA
technique could in  principle  also  be applied to
other neuroimaging techniques that afford higher
time resolution, such as electro- or magnetoen-
cephalography or  electrocorticography,  thus  po-
tentially resolving the problem that arises because
the representational carriers of perceptual content
are highly dynamic and thus require a time-re-
solved analysis. 
5 Conclusions
In summary, a complete theory for the neural cor-
relates of consciousness should be able to account
for the neural implementation of the contents of
consciousness. John-Dylan Haynes has proposed a
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clever  experimental  approach  to  localizing  the
contents of consciousness in the human brain, and
has found that the PFC does not seem to be in-
volved in this representation. Although surprising
at first sight, this null result lines up well with the
overall inconclusive evidence for a direct involve-
ment of the PFC in conscious perception. How-
ever, it remains to be seen whether localization is
the  most  fruitful  approach  to  identifying  the
neural correlates of consciousness, or whether a
more dynamic view that embraces the importance
of communication between brain areas will bring
us closer to solving the enigma of consciousness in
the brain. 
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